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Visual Perception as Patterning: Cavendish against Hobbes on Sensation 
 
Marcus P. Adams 
 
Abstract 
Many of Margaret Cavendish’s criticisms of Thomas Hobbes in the Philosophical Letters (1664) 
relate to the disorder and damage that she holds would result if Hobbesian pressure were the 
cause of visual perception. In this paper, I argue that her “two men” thought experiment in Letter 
IV is aimed at a different goal: to show the explanatory potency of her account. First, I connect 
Cavendish’s view of visual perception as “patterning” to the “two men” thought experiment in 
Letter IV. Second, I provide a potential reply on Hobbes’s behalf that appeals to physiological 
differences between perceivers’ sense organs, drawing upon Hobbes’s optics in De homine. 
Third, I argue that such a reply would misunderstand Cavendish’s objective of showing the 
limited explanatory resources available in understanding visual perception as pressing when 




In Margaret Cavendish’s view, her Philosophical Letters are the “building” (1664, preface; 
hereafter Letters) that rests upon the foundation already laid in her Philosophical and Physical 
Opinions (first edition 1655; second edition 1663; hereafter Opinions). In the Letters she 
criticizes Descartes, Hobbes, More, van Helmont, and others by arguing for the superiority of her 
philosophical system in its ability to explain various phenomena and to avoid the objections she 
highlights.  
Many of Cavendish’s criticisms of Hobbes in the Letters relate to the disorder and 
damage that she holds would result if pressure, as Hobbes claims, were the cause of visual 
perception and of cognitive activities such as the forming of conceptions. Pressure cannot be 
responsible for visual perception since it would more likely “annoy and obscure” than “inform” 
(1664, 20). If pressure were the cause of visual perception, the sentient organs would be “pressed 
to death” and parts of the body like the eye would be “pressed into the centre of the brain,” and 
the result would be a constant “war between the animal senses and the objects” (1664, 60). These 
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criticisms relate to Cavendish’s general desire to account for the order and regularity of natural 
phenomena in terms of bodies’ self-motion and perception by sensitive and rational matter.1 
 Beyond the disorder and damage that would result were Hobbes’s view correct, 
Cavendish’s assault in the Letters incorporates an additional worry for the perception-as-pressure 
model: Hobbes lacks the explanatory resources needed to accommodate everyday instances of 
differences in visual perception, such as between two individuals perceiving one another at a 
distance such that they perceive one another at differing degrees of clarity. To make this claim, 
in Letter IV Cavendish provides a thought experiment about two such individuals and argues that 
“if perception were made by pressure [as Hobbes holds], there would not be any such mistakes” 
in visual perception (1664, 20). 
 Scholarly discussions of Cavendish’s natural philosophy have focused on her desire to 
account for order and regularity. In this paper, I argue that her “two men” thought experiment in 
Letter IV is aimed at a different goal: to show the explanatory potency of her account and the 
corresponding lack of explanatory resources in Hobbesian natural philosophy. Cavendish holds 
that Hobbes is simply unable to explain the regular occurrence of differing levels of “perfection” 
in visual perception. Since Hobbes would seem to see the strengths of his natural philosophy as 
the twin aspects of 1) simple assumptions (we need only assume bodies in motion pressing upon 
each other) and 2) explanatory breadth (given these simple assumptions we can explain all 
                                                          
1 For discussion, see Duncan (2012, 397-399). Cavendish rejects both atomism and mechanism 
due to considerations of the orderliness of nature (Detlefsen 2006, 207ff; James 1999, 222). 
Detlefsen (2007) also connects Cavendish’s claims about order with the freedom of nature. Much 
of the scholarly focus on Cavendish’s view has been on the role of order and regularity as 
explanandum, but in the “two men” thought experiment that I discuss from the Letters (1664, 18-
20), as well as in Cavendish’s account of regularity in the Opinions (1663) that I discussion in 
section 4.2, order and regularity play the role of explanans when Cavendish appeals to the 
regularity of the motions in each of the senses. On the role of order as an assumption for 
Cavendish, see Boyle (2015, esp. 439). 
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perceptual and cognitive phenomena), Cavendish’s criticism in Letter IV is damaging. In a word, 
she argues that, in his inability to account for an everyday commonplace like small differences in 
perception, Hobbes’s assumptions are too simplistic. 
 My argument proceeds in three stages. First, I discuss Cavendish’s view of visual 
perception as “patterning,” and I show the consequences that this view has for the “two men” 
thought experiment in Letter IV. Second, I show that on a first reading of the thought experiment 
it seems that Hobbes could easily account for differences in visual perception between two 
individuals by appealing to physiological differences between the sense organs of each perceiver; 
indeed, by discussing Hobbes’s explanation of degraded perception in old age in De homine, I 
show that within his optics Hobbes appears to have these resources available to him. Cavendish 
may have viewed such a reply made on Hobbes’s behalf favorably in the 1650s, especially since 
she includes a chapter explaining “blindness” similarly in the first edition of Opinions (1655).  
However, this chapter on blindness is removed by the time of the 1663 edition of Opinions. 
By the 1660s Cavendish explains visual perception, and errors of it, by appealing to “patterning” 
self-motions as well as by appealing to ways in which the rational matter and sensitive matter 
can influence one another. Sometimes this influence causes mistakes in visual perception, for 
example, making us think that we see “Hobgoblins” or smell unusual scents (1663, 277). I focus 
on the 1663 edition of Opinions because of its closeness in Cavendish’s career to the Letters 
(1664).2 Third, I argue that offering such a reply on Hobbes’s behalf, where differences in sense 
                                                          
2 Additionally, Cavendish describes the 1663 edition as having “corrected” the 1655 edition. 
Walters (2013) has cogently argued that the 1663 edition of Opinions should be considered the 
more authoritative edition. My goal in the present paper is to understand the two men thought 
experiment with primary attention to the 1663 edition of Opinions. In addition to the aspect of 
closeness in time to the Letters, Cavendish herself identifies Opinions as the “ground” of her 
criticisms in Letter IV (1664, 18). In the final section, I draw upon Part VI of her later Ground of 
Natural Philosophy (1668), which she then also calls the “second edition” of Opinions. There in 
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organs would explain minor differences in the clarity of visual perception between two 
perceivers, would misunderstand Cavendish’s objective of showing the limited explanatory 
resources available in understanding visual perception as pressing – Cavendish’s claim is that 
pressure is too simplistic an explanans to account for the everyday occurrence of minor 
differences in visual perception.3 
 
2. Cavendish on sensitive and visual perception 
 
Cavendish is a materialist like Hobbes. However, Cavendish rejects Hobbes’s view that motion 
“cannot be generated except by [a body] moved and contiguous” (OL I.110).4 Instead, for 
Cavendish all motion is self-motion, often resulting from bodies perceiving and accommodating 
other bodies by means of such self-motion but other times occurring without any external body 
occasioning it, as in the case of the self-motions responsible for dreams (more on dreams below). 
Thus, there is no transfer of motion in situations where body-body contact appears to occur. 
Given her reliance upon self-motion as responsible for sensitive perception in general, 
and visual perception in particular, Cavendish agrees with some of the Hobbesian account of 
visual perception while rejecting other parts of it. In De corpore XXV, Hobbes defines sense as 
                                                          
Chapter XIII she explains the defects of sense organs in terms of a lack of knowledge proper to 
the kind of body parts they are (1668, 85-86). 
3 In what follows, I use ‘visual perception’ to refer to perception by humans and ‘sensitive 
perception’ to refer to the more general sort of perception that Cavendish holds occurs 
throughout all sensitive matter. 
4 This principle related to the generation of motion is essential to Hobbes’s explanation of 
sensation. Hobbes explicitly cites it in De corpore XXV (OL I.318). The Molesworth edition of 
Hobbes’s Latin Works and the 1655 edition (1655, 224) incorrectly record this citation as to De 
corpore VIII.9. Schumann (Hobbes 1999, 268) corrects the citation to De corpore IX.9. I cite 
Hobbes (2005) as EW and Hobbes (1839–45) as OL, followed by volume and page. Adams 
(2016) discusses Hobbes’s explanation of sensation in De corpore XXV and its connection to 
first philosophy and geometry. 
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“[...] a phantasm made by means of a reaction from an endeavour to [the] outside, which is 
generated by an internal endeavour from the object, and there remains for some time” (OL 
I.319).5 Thus according to Hobbes there are both external motions and internal motions involved 
in explaining visual perception. An instance of Hobbesian visual perception begins in motions 
from an object, which continue through various media, and ends in the resistance against those 
motions by the internal endeavour from the parts of the sentient body. Cavendish agrees with 
Hobbes that motion is responsible for visual perception, but since she holds that all motion is 
self-motion she denies that motion from external objects is transmitted to parts of the sentient 
body.  
When these internal self-motions are occasioned by the presence of an external body then 
visual perception occurs. However, sometimes these internal self-motions can occur even in the 
absence of any external occasion, leading to dreams or illusions. She notes later in the Ground of 
Natural Philosophy (hereafter Ground) that internal self-motions constitutive of visual 
perception move “according to the outward Object” but when we are asleep these self-motions 
“move by rote” (1668, 90). Since she identifies the “sense of seeing” with these internal self-
motions, she argues that even without sense organs like the eye being present the “sense of 
seeing is not lost”: 
 
…It is true, by Experience we find, that without an Eye we cannot see Outward 
objects as they are without us, yet we see those Objects as they are without us in 
our Sleep, when our Eyes be shut: Thus the Sense of Seeing is not lost, although 
the Eyes were out, and the Optick Nerves stop’d up (1663, 294-295). 
 
                                                          
5 The definition leaves open the worry that pressing inanimate bodies will be endowed with 
sense. Hobbes blocks this worry by claiming that for sense to occur there must be memory 
whereby we are able to make a judgment (OL I.320-321, EW I.393; for discussion, see Duncan 
2012). 
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Considering what happens during sleep, or after the removal of the eyes, is designed to force one 
to identify the cause of visual perception (this also applies for the other senses as well) as strictly 
internal. Since indistinguishable self-motions can be present when occasioned by an external 
body (an instance of visual perception) or without any such occasion (an instance of dreaming), 
they must be self-motions. On this point, Cavendish argues that “the Interior motions may move 
the Brain with the Variety of every Sense, without the Exterior Passages or Objects…” (1663, 
297). As a result, we cannot hold that it is “Outward objects that make the sense, but the Animate 
matter, which is Self-motion, which the Sense and Knowledge, and the Different motions 
therein, and therefrom, make the Differences thereof…” (1663, 298). 
Cavendish is led to this claim that in dreaming something indistinguishable to visual 
perception occurs, even in the absence of the eye, because she holds that all motion is self-
motion.6 However, more generally Cavendish can hold such a view because, although she rejects 
Hobbes’s account of perception, she embraces his understanding of cause as “entire cause” 
(causa integra) (cf. Eileen O’Neill’s discussion in Cavendish 1666/2001, xxxiii; Michaelian 
2009, 40). Hobbes defines an entire cause in De corpore IX.3: “But a cause simply, or an entire 
cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how many soever they be, and of 
the patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood 
but that the effect is produced at the same instant…” (EW I.121-122).7 With this understanding 
of causa integra, for Cavendish the internal self-motions of patterning and figuring are both 
necessary and sufficient causes for human visual perception or for self-motions that are 
                                                          
6 On this issue of dreams being indistinguishable to us from visual perception, in Opinions 
Cavendish argues that when the motions responsible for dreaming are “as strong and 
industrious” as when we are awake we may sometimes “see, here [sic], taste, smell, touch, as 
strong as if we were awake” (1655, 113).  
7 Leijenhorst (1996) connects Hobbes’s use of causa integra to Suarez.  
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indistinguishable from human visual perception, like dreaming.8 Another way of putting this 
point is that since causes are always necessary for their effects on the causa integra view, 
external bodies cannot be the cause of patterning since patterning can occur without any such 
external objects being present (cf. Michaelian 2009, 40, fn. 23 for discussion). 
 In place of the Hobbesian principle that motion “cannot be generated except by [a body] 
moved and contiguous” (OL I.110), Cavendish holds a form of vitalism according to which 
matter exists in three “degrees”: inanimate, sensitive, and rational. She describes these degrees of 
matter in Opinions (1663): “As for the Infinite Degrees of Matter, there be but two which are 
Principle, as, Animate and Unanimate, and the Degrees of Animate are but Sensitive and 
Rational, and the Degrees of Unanimate Matter is but Dense, Rare, Light and Heavy” (1663, 8). 
These degrees of matter do not exist in isolation from one another as parts of the “Only Matter”; 
rather, they are mixed together throughout nature so that “no particle in nature can be conceived 
or imagined, which is not composed of animate matter, as well as of inanimate…” (1666, 158). 
 In adopting a form of vitalism whereby “the Only and Infinite Matter is Living and 
Knowing” (1663, 13), Cavendish need not provide a mechanism on account of which 
phenomena such as visual perceiving are made mechanically intelligible.9 On Cavendish’s view, 
visual perception occurs by means of a capacity where the sensitive matter patterns after the 
                                                          
8 I limit this claim to humans since Cavendish demurs on whether patterning and figuring 
motions are responsible for sensitive perception more generally: “Neither can I certainly affirm, 
that all perception consists in patterning out exterior objects; for although the perception of our 
human senses is made that way, yet nature’s actions being so various, I dare not conclude from 
thence, that all the perceptions of the infinitely various parts and figures of nature are all made 
after the same manner” (Cavendish 1666, 140). 
9 Unlike Hobbes, whose aim was to make perceiving and cognition mechanically intelligible 
(Adams 2014). 
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motions of air, and the air itself self-moves as it copies after the self-motions of the objects being 
perceived:  
 
…the Motions of Outward objects Move and Figure the Air, being a Rare and 
Soft Agil Substance, to its own Likeness, and so long as those Figures or Motions 
last, those Figures and Motions are Sensible to the Senses, for the Senses Move 
according to the Motions of the Objects in the Air, and for the most part, the 
Reason Moves according to the Senses” (1663, 301-302; emphasis added). 
 
When she asserts that the “Motions of Outward objects Move and Figure the Air,” we must 
understand the motion of the air as one of self-motion and imitation. Elsewhere in Opinions, 
Cavendish compares the motions of “soft or porous” air in response to “solid bodies” moving to 
what happens when creatures “…print themselves in Snow…” (1663, 218-219). She holds that 
“…as we move from Place to Place, new Figures are made [in the porous bodies such as air]” 
(1663, 219). Since air is more porous and soft, it is more imitative and thus takes on the “print” 
of more solid bodies. I suggest that Cavendish understands these motions, which air acquires, as 
self-motions which appear and disappear easily. For example, she notes that “…when the Air is 
Thin and Serene, the Print Dissolves as soon as the Figure Removes” (Ibid.). Even though air is 
involved in this account of visual perception in Opinions (1663), it must be emphasized that air’s 
self-motion would serve only as a medium for our visual perception of objects, and air is not 
mentioned elsewhere in Cavendish’s explanations of visual perception.10 
                                                          
10 For example, air plays no role in the example from the Letters (1664, 20) to be discussed 
below. Also, in Observations (1666) air plays no role in chapters XXXV and XXXVI; instead, 
Cavendish refers to perception “of exterior objects” (e.g., 1666, 150; cf. 1668, 55). Although air 
plays a role only in the discussion of visual perception in Opinions (1663), it is possible to 
accommodate the involvement of air into the accounts that we find in Observations and Ground. 
Here two points are relevant. First, as discussed already, Cavendish holds that “no particle in 
nature can be conceived or imagined, which is not composed of animate matter, as well as of 
inanimate…” (1666, 158). As a result, even though it is “soft” or “porous,” air will be composed 
of both animate and inanimate matter, and the animate parts are capable of self-motion. Second, 
the analogy between speech and perception that Cavendish makes in Opinions (1663, 299), 
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For Hobbes, Cavendish’s account of visual perception as the sensitive matter patterning 
after the self-motion of the air leaves a gap unexplained, a gap that Hobbes would claim makes 
the view inconceivable. Since the subject of philosophy for Hobbes is “every body of which we 
can conceive any generation” (EW I.10), patterning understood as self-motion would be 
inconceivable because we are unable to imagine one body patterning after the motion of another 
body without some body-body contact. In other words, Hobbes holds that attempting to 
understand patterning, or any type of motion for that matter, as self-motion requires one to try to 
imagine an ungenerated generation – something that is inconceivable.11 Unlike Hobbes’s appeal 
to pressure, which for Hobbes fills the gap in Cavendish’s account, Cavendish posits that 
sensitive matter has the ability to pattern motions outside of it.12 Once the sensitive matter in a 
perceiver has patterned the motions of the air around an object, the rational matter (called 
“Reason” in the quote above) patterns the motions of the sensitive matter.  
                                                          
discussed below in Section 4, might help illuminate how we could understand the role of air in 
visual perception. Perception between an object and a perceiver requires the motions of the thing 
being perceived to be communicated, but without any sort of body-body transmission. Air’s 
ability to self-move in imitation of an object’s motions – what she calls being a “print” in 
Opinions (1663, 218-219) – could enable this communication. Thus, just like when someone 
speaks to a group of people there “are made Multitudes of Copies” of her words (1663, 300), we 
might also expect Cavendish to hold that many copies of an object could be made in the air, like 
a print in snow, and these copies would then enable our visual perception of it. 
11 Conceivability as a constraint for philosophizing is operative when Hobbes introduces what 
Jesseph (2006) calls the “persistence principle” in De corpore VIII.19: “Whatsoever is at rest, 
will always be at rest, unless there be some other body besides it which, by endeavouring to get 
in its place by motion, suffers it no longer to remain at rest” (EW I.115). Any attempt to 
conceive self-motion, that is, to imagine a body self-moving, for Hobbes would be an exercise in 
self-deceit (Jesseph 2006, 134). Adams (2014) discusses conceivability more generally in 
Hobbes’s project. 
12 In works following Opinions (1663) and Letters (1664), Cavendish adds self-knowledge to her 
account of perception (more on self-knowledge below). She claims, for example, that “self-
knowledge is the fundamental cause of perception” (1666, 176). See Michaelian (2009, 32-33, 
fn. 7). 
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 This key difference between Cavendish and Hobbes – patterning instead of pressure by 
body-body contact – figures in Cavendish’s thought experiment in Letter IV of the Letters 
(1664). Cavendish begins Letter IV by highlighting Leviathan I as her target, where she quotes 
Hobbes: “That the cause of Sense or Sensitive perception is the external body of Object, which 
presses the Organ proper to each Sense” (1664, 18). She appeals to Opinions as the “ground” of 
her objection against Hobbes, repeating the view already discussed that “…Perception is but the 
effect of the Sensitive and rational Motions” (1664, 18). She next raises a particular worry for the 
pressure account related to bodies that may lie between two perceiving individuals:  
 
Two men may see or hear each other at a distance, and yet there may be other 
bodies between them, that do not move to those perceptions, so that no pressure 
can be made, for all pressures are by some constraint and force; wherefore, 
according to my Opinion, the Sensitive and Rational free motions, do pattern out 
each others object, as Figure and Voice in each others Eye and Ear; for Life and 
Knowledge, which I name Rational and Sensitive Matter, are in every Creature… 
(1664, 18-19; emphasis added). 
 
Like Hobbes, Cavendish is a plenist.13 In this thought experiment she assumes Hobbes’s view of 
pressure as moving bodies between these perceivers for a reductio ad absurdum. Given the 
pressure view, the worry is that if Hobbes were correct, at certain distances the bodies located 
between two perceivers may not move. Were such a scenario possible and yet visual perception 
still occurred, pressure could not be responsible for visual perception. 
 This objection related to the possibility that bodies lying between perceivers may not 
move even though visual perception occurs is not devastating since Hobbes could reply that we 
should understand the strength of the pressure responsible for visual perception between two 
perceivers in degrees. The closer two perceivers are to one another (or one perceiver to any 
                                                          
13 Several passages in the Letters suggest that Cavendish is a plenist (1668, 290, 301-302, and 
423). 
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perceived object), the stronger the pressure would be and, as a result, the more the bodies 
between them would be pressed and the more vivid the visual perception would be. Hobbes 
would deny that there are bodies that would communicate absolutely no motion, since he claims 
in De corpore XXII.9 that “in a full medium all endeavour proceeds as far as the medium itself 
reacheth; that is to say, if the medium be infinite, the endeavour will proceed infinitely” (EW 
I.341).  
Nevertheless, Hobbes could admit that certain bodies transmit pressure better than others, 
so some bodies would be more likely to deaden the pressure than others. For example, both 
Kepler and Descartes identify certain parts of the interior of the eye as black in color so that they 
deaden light rays passing into the eye (Kepler 1964, 160; Kepler 1604, 176; Descartes 2001, 95; 
Descartes 1972, 53-55) and by doing so these parts of the eye contribute to distinct vision. Like 
Kepler and Descartes, Hobbes notes in A Minute or First Draught of the Optiques (1983, 81-82) 
that the pupil and ciliary processes are black. Although Hobbes does not explicitly claim that the 
reason why these parts are black is to deaden reflecting rays, he could accommodate the 
Keplerian-Cartesian explanation into his pressure-as-perception account by positing that dark-
colored bodies like these parts of the eye deaden pressure and thus contribute positively to 
distinct vision, which for Hobbes occurs along the optic axis. 
This reply to Cavendish’s first worry in Letter IV has affinity with how Hobbes 
understands the motions that are constitutive of perceiving, imagining, dreaming, and 
remembering in terms of the degree of their intensity. For example, in Leviathan II Hobbes 
identifies imagination as “nothing but decaying sense” (Hobbes 1994, 8; emphasis original). As 
the motion responsible for sense continues to decay, it becomes “fading, old, and past,” and this 
is what we call “memory” (Hobbes 1994, 9). A view that understood the pressure between 
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perceivers in degrees could hold that there needs to be a threshold of pressure reached for visual 
perception to occur: if there were bodies that did not move easily between two perceivers then a 
sufficient degree of pressure could not be transmitted and continued to a perceiver. As a result, 
these two individuals may not perceive one another at all.14 
 Cavendish’s second objection in Letter IV continues with the same example of two men 
perceiving one another at a distance. She argues that “…if the sensitive and rational motions be 
irregular in those parts [of the sensitive organs], between which the perception is made, as for 
example, in the two fore-mentioned men, that see and hear each other, then they neither both see 
nor hear each other perfectly” (1664, 19-20). Here Cavendish is taking what she thinks is an 
everyday example drawn from experience: in a two-perceiver situation, person A may perceive 
person B more clearly than B perceives A. Another similar example would involve two 
individuals perceiving the same object at differing levels of clarity, though Cavendish does not 
mention this possibility: individual A may perceive some object C more or less perfectly than 
another individual B standing next to him or her.  
 Cavendish claims that her account of visual perception as patterning can explain this 
everyday occurrence better than Hobbes’s account. It is commonplace that “one [individual] may 
see the other better and more perfectly”; however, Cavendish argues that “if perception were 
made by pressure, there would not be any such mistakes” (1664, 20). Cavendish’s criticism of 
the pressure view seems to rely upon seeing Hobbesian visual perception as passive for 
perceivers. On the pressure account, the information, as it were, acquired by perceiving human 
perceivers is impressed upon sense organs by the motions from bodies outside of the perceiver, 
                                                          
14 Hobbes provides an example of our inability to see a single grain of sand that is “removed to 
such a distance as not to be any longer seen, though by its action it still work upon the organs of 
sight” (De corpore XXII.9, EW I.342). 
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which information continues into the body of the perceiving individuals by pressure of one part 
of the body upon another.  
Cavendish’s idea is that if pressure alone were sufficient to explain visual perception, and 
perceivers (and their sense organs) played a passive role during it, then we should expect 
uniform levels of clarity in visual perception. Two persons perceiving each other, or perhaps two 
individuals perceiving the same object, should both perceive with the same level of clarity since 
only the pressure from without would determine how clearly an object is perceived (and since 
she seems to consider Hobbesian visual perception as passive, this pressure would be equal for 
both perceivers). Since we do, in fact, experience differences in the clarity of visual perception 
on a regular basis, Cavendish holds that we should clearly see the deficiency of Hobbes’s 
perception-as-pressure account.  
 This second criticism of the Hobbesian perception-as-pressure account is potentially 
more damaging than the first criticism encountered in Letter IV (already discussed), for if it were 
correct it would undercut the explanatory breadth of Hobbes’s account by showing that his 
assumptions about the nature of visual perception were too simplistic. Unlike Cavendish’s other 
criticisms of Hobbes in the Letters, which relate to the general disorder and disunity of the world 
that would result were his account correct, what she calls a “perpetual dance …which would 
produce a very Restless Life” (1663, Another Epistle to the Reader), this criticism instead points 
to a phenomenon that Cavendish argues Hobbes is unable to explain. In the next section, I will 
provide a response on Hobbes’s behalf that draws upon his optical work in De homine and then 
in the following section re-characterize Cavendish’s objection in light of this Hobbesian response 
as relating to a different explanandum than the order and regularity present in the world (see fn. 
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3. A Hobbesian reply to Cavendish’s criticism in Letter IV 
 
A reply on Hobbes’s behalf to Cavendish’s second criticism would appeal to physiological 
differences in the sense organs between the two individuals in her thought experiment. 
According to this reply, we can account for person A perceiving person B less perfectly than B 
perceives A because of some defect in A’s sense organs. Likewise, if we focused on the parallel 
example of two individuals perceiving the same object, we could explain why individual B 
perceives the basketball more perfectly than individual A because of either some defect of her 
sense organs or because of some disturbance in the media between the ball and A not present in 
the media between B and the ball. The perception-as-pressure account would understand 
differences in the clarity of visual perception by A and B to be due to a disruption in the pressure 
from the perceived object to the perceivers, whether a disruption by the receiving sense organ or 
something in the media. In this section, I first discuss this reply on Hobbes’s behalf by drawing 
upon his explanation of the “confusion of vision by the fault of the eye” in De homine 2.4. Next I 
show that this explanation may have been amenable to Cavendish in her first edition of the 
Opinions (1655), but it would not have been acceptable to her by the time of her second edition 
of that work (1663) and likewise not in her Letters (1664). 
 After Hobbes discusses the optic axis, the visual line “in which alone is vision distinct” 
(OL II.11), he treats instances where vision in the optic axis is “confused.” Hobbes focuses first 
on cases in which vision is “confused from the smallness of an object” (De homine 2.3, OL 
II.11). He argues that whenever we perceive very small objects, or large objects that are very far 
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away, our vision is confused because the pupil is unable to be contracted sufficiently to allow 
only the rays from those small objects to enter and thus prevent oblique rays, such as the oblique 
ray from object A that strikes the pupil at C and after passing through E and reflects along the 
line E-F (see Figure 1 below). Such rays enter and confuse our vision, as Hobbes demonstrates 
with a constructed diagram of an eye, because “pupil C is not able to be contracted in order to 
shut out all of the oblique rays” (OL II.11). 
 
Figure 1 (from 1658 edition of De homine) 
 
 
 In the following article (De homine 2.4), Hobbes examines instances when vision is 
confused “from the fault of the eye” (a vitio oculorum; OL II.12). Hobbes retains the diagram 
from the previous article, but now he supposes two additional conditions related to the size and 
shape of the parts of the eye. First, he considers what would result from having a retina of a 
smaller shape than the retina considered in De homine 2.3; he compares the original retina with a 
smaller retina described by M-B-I on Figure 1. He argues that “the confusion at each point of the 
object to this point will be greater” with retina M-B-I because “the center of the retina will be 
nearer to the lowest part B” around point H.  
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Confusion will be greater because of the way that rays would refract inside an eye with a 
smaller retina like M-B-I. As already mentioned, for the eye considered in De homine 2.3, when 
the ray from A strikes the pupil obliquely at C it reflects away from the retina along line E-F. 
When this happens, our vision is confused, and we perceive object A as located in the wrong 
location: “point A will appear at the line E-F” (OL I.11). However, when the eye with retina M-
B-I is considered, Hobbes argues that, after the ray from object A strikes the retina at B, it will 
pass through the center of the retina at point H, rather than at point E. As a result, it will continue 
along line H-G, causing object A to appear along line H-G.  
The smaller spherical shape of retina M-B-I thus causes greater confusion of vision when 
we perceive objects, such as object A, by means of oblique rays. The reason for this is that the 
apparent location is farther from the actual location of object A than the apparent location would 
be with the originally-considered, larger retina. In other words, if the size of the retina were 
smaller, our perception of objects by means of oblique rays, which is already confused, would be 
even more confused; we would perceive objects such as A along H-G which is farther away from 
perceiving them as being along E-F, and thus more confused. 
The second condition, or fault, of the eye leading to confused vision that Hobbes 
considers results from a change in the crystalline humour. He considers what consequences there 
would be from this humour being smaller or larger in size, or being farther from or closer to the 
retina. In each of these dispositions of the crystalline humour, “the confusion will always be 
greater” (OL II.12) than its typical arrangement. Vision would be more confused with these 
changes because the refractions that would result would be greater and thus cause point A to be 
seen alone a line that is further to the left or right of the optic axis than A would otherwise 
appear. 
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These demonstrations related to the two conditions of the parts of the eye, made upon the 
basis of the behavior of refracting and reflecting lines, allow Hobbes to explain conditions that 
result in confused vision. For example, a corollary that he draws from these explanations 
explains that one reason why confused vision occurs in old age, or why it occurs with those who 
are “dim-sighted,” is that the retina is contracted, becoming smaller like the retina described by 
M-B-I in Figure 1 (OL II.12-13). He notes that eyeglasses, or “a perforated plate with a small 
aperture, or a small pipe brought into contact with the eye” provide a remedy for those with such 
a “fault” in vision because they filter out the oblique rays that would otherwise confuse vision. 
This foray into the optics of De homine has had the goal of showing a possible reply to 
Cavendish that Hobbes could have offered. Cavendish claims in Letter IV that in the case of two 
individuals perceiving one another, “one may see the other better and more perfectly” but “if 
perception were made by pressure, there would not be any such mistakes” (1664, 20). However, 
in De homine 2 we find a potential answer to this objection. If one of the two individuals in 
Cavendish’s thought experiment were “dim-sighted,” to use Hobbes’s term, then the dim-sighted 
individual would see the other less perfectly than the other saw him. Granting Cavendish’s 
assumptions in the thought experiment, we could say that the pressure being transmitted by 
media between A and B would be equal, but that the reception of that pressure by the dim-
sighted individual A would be hindered, thus causing him to have a less perfect perception of B 
than B has of A. 
Cavendish may have found this Hobbes-inspired reply satisfying around the time of her 
work in the 1650s. Indeed, in Chapter 162 of the first edition of Opinions (1655), she explains 
blindness similarly by outlining the seven “defects” that cause it. By “blindness” she does not 
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mean the total loss of sight but instead she means the obscuring of vision, as is evident from one 
example that she provides of it as perceiving objects in a location other than their actual location: 
 
A second defect may be in the ball of the eye; for according to the compasse of 
the concave, or convex thereof, the objects are presented nearer, or at a further 
distance, or longer or shorter, or broader, or narrower (1655, 121). 
 
Cavendish claims that the curvature of the ball of the eye will influence the location at which we 
perceive objects in our visual field, a claim similar to the way in which the size of the sphere of 
the retina M-B-I would impact the apparent location of perceived objects for Hobbes. However, 
this explanation of “blindness” that she provides in Chapter 162 of the 1655 edition is not present 
in the later 1663 edition, and neither are the other six explanations that she offers in that earlier 
work. 
In the 1655 edition there appears to be a tension between two views about the nature of 
visual perception. On the one hand, Cavendish claims that “…the sense of seeing is not lost, 
although the eyes were out, and the optick nerves stopped up” (1655, 118; retained in 1663, 294-
295, discussed in section 2 above). This view appears to diminish the role of the sensory organs 
in explaining visual perception. On the other hand, as seen above in the quotation, Cavendish 
aims to explain “blindness,” understood as obscured vision, not by appeal to differences in 
patterning self-motions, as would be expected from the later “two men” thought experiment in 
the Letters (1664), but by appeal to features of the sense organs like the curvature of the “ball of 
the eye.” Other physical features she considers in Chapter 162 of the 1655 edition include what 
would be the result if the optick nerve “be full of slime” or if the “eyes move too quick, or too 
slow” (1655, 122).  
Given the tension between these two views, it seems that in 1655 Cavendish could 
explain differences in the visual perceptions of the two individuals either by appeal to 
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physiological differences by appealing to the roundness of eye balls, the size of pupils, and so 
on, or by appeal to differences in patterning self-motions. However, by the 1663 edition of 
Opinions this tension disappears because she removes the explanations of blindness, and she 
abandons explaining differences in visual perception between individuals by reference to 
physiological differences in the parts of the eye. She is similarly unconcerned with offering such 
explanations in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666).15 
Although in 1655 Cavendish may have been persuaded by the potential Hobbesian reply 
to the “two men” thought experiment criticism offered above, by the time of her second edition 
of the Opinions (1663) and the Letters (1664) she would not have accepted an explanation of 
differences in visual perception by appeal to physical characteristics of the sense organs. 
Cavendish’s removal of the explanations blindness is evidence for this claim; the main difficulty 
for the Hobbesian account of perception by the time of the publications of the 1660s is that it 
relies upon pressure. As I discuss in the following section, in the 1660s Cavendish holds that 
pressure is explanatorily impotent when it comes to accounting for differences in visual 
perception like those present in the “two men” thought experiment.  
 
 
4. Reconsidering the “Two Men” Thought Experiment 
 
4.1 Sensory Organs and Explaining Defects in Hearing and Seeing 
 
The discussion regarding Cavendish’s removal of the chapter on “blindness” between the 1655 
and 1663 editions of Opinions should not be taken to imply that in the later works she saw the 
                                                          
15 Cavendish’s interest in blindness in Observations concerns what blind individuals could know 
about color by touch (1666, 82-83, 87) and the sort of motions that occur in the “optic 
sensorium” even in the absence of being able to use the optic sense in case of blindness (1666, 
154). 
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structure of sense organs as entirely irrelevant to visual perception. Instead, I will show in this 
section that this removal should be seen as part of her greater emphasis upon self-motion and 
patterning in the 1663 edition. The primary issue behind her criticism of Hobbes in Letter IV is 
not whether defects in sense organs are sufficient to explain differences in perceptions between 
the two individuals; instead, the issue is whether the perception-as-pressure model is sufficiently 
explanatorily potent. The thought experiment is designed to show that the Hobbesian model is 
not explanatorily potent. 
 Although Cavendish removes her chapter on blindness from 1663 edition, she does hold 
that parts of the body are sometimes relevant to explaining certain aspects of perception in later 
works. She uses communication by speech between human individuals as a model for thinking 
about how the senses work. She begins making this connection by noting that 
 
…some may think it strange, that One Word should strike or enter into Several 
Ears at One Time, but surely it is not more strange that One Word should strike 
…many Several Ears than that One Object shall enter into many Several Eyes at 
One Time… (1663, 299). 
 
The connection between hearing a spoken word and two perceivers seeing the same object is 
meant to be straightforward. The self-motions of the senses constitute visual perception by 
imitating the motions of the objects, and in the same way the self-motions of other parts of the 
body imitate the motions responsible for the communication of words from one speaker to 
another.  
Speech and perception both depend upon the production – by patterning – of many copies 
of self-motions. Cavendish explains how there is a multitude of such copies made when 
communication by words occurs: “when as a Man Speaks to an other man, [words] are made 
many times over Several ways; as for Example, a Man before he Speaks, Thinks of those Words 
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he should speak, then those are made in the Mind of the Speaker, by the Rational matter and 
motions…” (1663, 299-300). Cavendish continues by noting that these words, as motions, are 
then copied in the mouth of the speaker, in the speaker’s ears when he hears himself speak, and 
finally in the listener’s ears when he hears and in his mind. If the speaker is communicating to a 
group of individuals, then from the words he speaks “are made Multitudes of Copies” (1663, 
300). 
Communication by words occurs not by some transmission of motion from one body to 
another, but by the sensitive matter of one body imitating the self-motion of another by 
patterning. This model of patterning present in verbal communication also explains how 
perception works. However, and here we find the relevance of the sensory organs even in 
Cavendish’s works of the 1660s, if multiple copies of sounds or figures perceived are present, 
one might worry that “more would enter the Ear [or Eye] than was needful, and so would make a 
Confusion” (1663, 301). The apparent worry is that multiple copies would be copied 
simultaneously by an eye or an ear and result in confused perception or hearing. Cavendish 
responds to this worry by asserting that properly functioning sense organs will imitate only what 
is necessary: “I answer, that [such a confusion] cannot easily be, unless the Ear be Defective, the 
like for the Eye, as so for the other Senses” (1663, 301; emphasis added). So in some instances 
defective visual perception or hearing can be explained by a fault of the sense organs, but the 
fault in such organs would be a fault in patterning; for example, they may pattern too many 
motions and cause confusion. 
 Cavendish discusses the special role for sense organs, such as the eye in perception, later 
in Observations (1666). She considers the following question: “But some may ask, If a man be 
so blind that he cannot make use of his optic sense; what is become of the sensitive motions in 
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that same part of his body, to wit, the optic sensorium?” (1666, 154). She argues that even in the 
absence of a functioning eye, these motions in the optic sensorium will continue, but they will be 
altered or changed, allowing a blind individual to “guess by touch.” But such a guess by touch of 
how an object would appear if seen will be imperfect since “we cannot perfectly know it, except 
we saw it, by reason the perception of sight belongs only to the optic sense” (1666, 154).  
If Cavendish holds that the sense organs are relevant to explaining visual perception, and 
to accounting for why visual perception can be more or less perfect, why would she reject the 
Hobbesian reply to the “two men” thought experiment offered in the preceding section? 
Although she removes the explanations of blindness from the 1663 edition of Opinions, she 
nevertheless appeals to sense organs as explanatorily relevant in that same edition, as already 
discussed, and in the later Observations (1666). In the remainder of this section, I will argue that 
the reason why the Hobbesian reply offered above in section 3 would fail in Cavendish’s view is 
that it would still rely upon understanding the motion responsible for perception as pressure. 
Cavendish agrees with Hobbes that visual perception must be understood in terms of motion, but 
she articulates rational and sensitive self-motion as capable of more diverse forms of motion than 
simplistic Hobbesian pressure. Pressure is too blunt an explanans to do the work needed in 
explaining differences, sometimes subtle differences, in perception. 
 
4.2 Pressure as the Target of the Two Men Thought Experiment 
 
Given Cavendish’s interest in explaining some instances of imperfect perception or hearing by 
appealing to the sense organs in both the works from the 1650s and 1660s, as already discussed, 
it is worth attending to her mention of sense organs in the thought experiment from Letter IV. 
She notes about these two men that 
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…if one’s motions be perfect, but the other’s irregular and erroneous, then one 
sees and hears better than the other; or if the Sensitive and Rational Motions move 
more regularly and make perfecter patterns in the Eye then in the Ear, then they 
see better than they hear; and if more perfectly in the Ear than in the Eye, they 
hear better than they see: And so it may be said of each man singly, for one man 
may see the other better and more perfectly, then the other may see him; and this 
man may hear the other better and more perfectly, then the other may hear him; 
whereas, if perception were made by pressure, there would not be any such 
mistakes. (1664, 20) 
 
I have included the complete quotation from the thought experiment in Letter IV of the Letters 
because it shows the ways that Cavendish thinks that her account of self-motion can handle 
slight differences between situations that she holds Hobbes cannot. Against Hobbes, Cavendish 
claims that “if perception were made by pressure, there would not be any such mistakes” in 
perception (1664, 20). 
 Although Cavendish’s criticism that “besides the hard pressure of objects…would rather 
annoy and obscure, then inform” (1664, 20) is distinct from the criticism I am examining (it is 
related to the criticism that disorder that would result from perception-as-pressure), it does reveal 
how she thinks of Hobbesian pressure. It seems that on Cavendish’s view the pressure to which 
Hobbes appeals is a unilateral, forceful motion that could not account for subtle differences in 
perception between individuals like those considered in the “two men” thought experiment. In 
the face of the force of the pressure from external objects, the perceiver is passive. 
In contrast to Hobbesian pressure, in Opinions Cavendish portrays the rational and 
sensitive motions as much more complex in nature, capable of representing better because they 
are capable of more diverse forms of motion, as well as active in patterning out the self-motions 
that they witness. Thus to explain an instance of imperfect perception, Cavendish may appeal to 
a deficit in patterning by a sense organ or to the motions of the sensitive or rational matter as 
they imitate one another. In Opinions Part VI, chapter XVI, she describes the rational and 
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sensitive matter as “the highest Extract” and as the “Quintessence of Nature (1663, 275). The 
rational animate matter has “no incumbrances” when it moves, and it “can Divide and Unite, 
Dilatate and Contract itself Infinite Several ways in its own Substance and motions” (1663, 275). 
The sensitive animate matter moves “after another manner” because it is linked with the 
inanimate matter: “…it Divides and Composes, Dilatates and Contracts with the Inanimate 
matter” (1663, 275). In contrast to Hobbesian pressure, Cavendish holds that these self-motions 
are capable of a greater degree of differences than pressure and thus are more explanatorily 
potent. 
In addition to positing motions that are more complex than simple Hobbesian pressure, in 
the extended quotation above from the “two men” thought experiment Cavendish appeals to the 
regularity of a perceiver’s rational and sensitive motions. She holds that “if the Sensitive and 
Rational Motions move more regularly and make perfecter patterns in the Eye then in the Ear, 
then they see better than they hear” (1664, 20). The regularity of the sensitive or rational motions 
of a creature can explain why its perceptions have a particular quality, but the way that the 
regularity of the rational and sensitive motions are coordinated with one another also impacts the 
clarity of perception. She argues in Opinions that in the typically-functioning creature there will 
be a “sympathetical agreement, and Natural Unity between the Rational and Sensitive matter and 
motions” (1663, 75), but imperfect perception will result where such an “agreement” is lacking.16  
                                                          
16 This understanding typical function as sympathetical agreement might seem to run contrary to 
the earlier discussion of the two men thought experiment as designed to show how Cavendish 
can better account for differences in clarify of perception among typical perceivers. This tension 
appears to arise within the text of the Letters where Cavendish views irregular motions as “those 
motions which move not after the ordinary, common or usual way or manner” (Letters, 360) or 
as “not always moving after their usual and accustomed way” (Letters, 538). I suggest that 
Cavendish understands typical function as a continuum, and that typically-functioning 
perceivers, like the individuals in the two men thought experiment, may nevertheless make small 
errors. This view is supported by a distinction that Cavendish makes in Ground between “small 
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This agreement that Cavendish describes occurs for “safety and defense” of creatures, so 
that when a creature is attacked by another creature “all the Powers, Faculties… strive to defend 
themselves from Hurt or Dissolution; the Rational advises, the sensitive acts…” (1663, 75). The 
ability of the rational matter to “advise” should be understood as having an influence whereby 
the sensitive matter is more likely to imitate (pattern) the motions of the rational matter than the 
rational matter is to imitate the sensitive.17 In other words, this influence of the rational matter 
upon the sensitive matter occurs not by means of a transfer of motion by pressure but rather by 
the rational matter causing the sensitive to move like a hand can cause a ball to self-move. As 
Cavendish will argue later in the Observations, the ball does not “move by the hand’s motion, 
but by its own,” for the hand is “only an occasion that the …ball moves thus and thus” (1666, 
139-140). 
Sometimes the rational matter and sensitive matter break from this sympathetical 
agreement and instead act at odds with one another. When such a disturbance occurs, the internal 
self-motions are disrupted and the functions of the creature, such as visual perception, are 
negatively affected. In Opinions Part VI, chapter XVIII, Cavendish describes this sympathetical 
agreement in terms of the regularity of motions and its disruption in terms of their irregularity. 
When the motions of the sensitive and rational matter are both regular they agree, but sometimes 
                                                          
Errors” and “high Irregularities.” This distinction suggests that she would view the two men 
thought experiment as a common-place small error in need of being explained: “when one man 
mistakes another, that is some small Error, both of the Sense and Reason. Also, when one man 
cannot readily remember another man, with whom he had formerly been acquainted, it is an 
Error; and such small Errors, the Sense and Reason do soon rectifie: but in causes of high 
Irregularities, as in Madness, Sickness, and the like, there is a great Bustle amongst the Parts of a 
Human Creature” (1668, 82-83).  
17 Cavendish will similarly argue in Observations that rational perception is superior to sensitive 
perception because rational perception is “so active and subtle, as it is the best informer and 
reformer of all sensitive perception” (1666, 47). For discussion, see Boyle (2015, 445-446). 
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the “Rational motions are Regular, and the Sensitive Irregular” (1663, 277) and there is a 
disruption. Likewise, the sensitive motions may be regular while the rational motions are 
irregular, causing disruption of the internal motions.  
Similar to the way in which the rational matter can influence the sensitive matter by 
“advising” it, through their self-motions the rational and sensitive matter can influence one 
another to be irregular: “oftentimes the Irregularity of the Rational motions, causes the 
Irregularity of the Sensitive, and oftentimes the Irregularity of the Sensitive motions, causes the 
Irregularity of the Rational” (1663, 277). Indeed, in Part VI, chapter XVII Cavendish holds that 
the “Rational motions in the Mind have great Power over the Sensitive motions in the Body” 
(1663, 276). She describes this influence as the ability of the rational motions to “persuade” or 
“command” the sensitive motions (also “inform” and “reform”; cf. fn. 17). 
The influence that the rational motions have over the sensitive is understood as the 
greater inclination of the sensitive motions to pattern after the rational motions. As an example, 
Cavendish considers when “the Rational motions are so much Irregular, as to be Tumultuous, so 
as to cause Fearfull Imaginations….which cause the Sensitive motions to move Irregularly and 
Tumultuously” (1663, 277). This irregularity of the rational motions “causes the Sensitive 
motions to Print in the Sensitive passages Irregular Objects” such as “Hobgoblins, Spirits, and 
Devils” or to hear strange noises, smell unusual scents, and feel unusual touches (1663, 277). 
Such a violence of the rational motions when mimicked by the sensitive motions can impart 
unusual strength and intensity to the sensitive motions, which Cavendish takes to explain why 
“Mad men in the Mad fits, have many times more Strength” than they do otherwise (1663, 278). 
In summary, Cavendish’s criticism in Letter IV of Hobbesian perception-as-pressure as 
unable to account for “any such mistakes” in perception (1664, 20) reflects her views about the 
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diverse kinds of motions that are responsible for visual perception. The diverse motions of which 
the sensitive and rational matter are capable – motions of dividing and composing, as well as of 
dilating and contracting – provide the potential for finer detail and greater explanatory potency 
than the overly simplistic perception-as-pressure model where perceivers are passive. With such 
diverse motions in her account, Cavendish can explain more subtle differences between 
perceivers than Hobbes can with pressure. In addition to being able to appeal to these types of 
motions, Cavendish can also appeal to differences in the regularity of the sensitive and rational 
motions, and to the influence of one upon the other.  
Cavendish later develops her account of visual perception in Part VI of the Ground 
(1668). There she appeals to the self-knowledge that parts of human bodies have regarding how 
they are to act (Boyle 2015, 441-442). In Chapter IX, Cavendish compares the knowledge that 
body parts have to the knowledge that individual humans have: “…as one Human Creature doth 
not know what another Human Creature knows but by Confederacy; so, no Part of the Body, or 
Mind of a Man, knows each Part’s perceptive knowledg[e], but by Confederacy” (1668, 81-82). 
As in her earlier accounts discussed already, she appeals to regularity to understand the 
coordination between reason and sense: “sometimes, the Human Sense is regular, and the Human 
Reason irregular; and sometimes the Reason regular, and the Sense irregular” (1668, 82). When 
such difference occurs, she holds that “the Regular Parts endeavour to reform the Irregular” 
(Ibid.). Sometimes the errors introduced are “small,” but other times “high Irregularities” occur 
(cf. fn. 16). 
This account of properly-functioning parts knowing what they should do, as possessing 
self-knowledge, in Ground allows Cavendish to explain being blind, for example, by identifying 
the eyes themselves as “natural fools.” She argues that with such a “defect” “those Parts have no 
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knowledg[e] of such Properties that belong to such Parts” (1668, 85). Blindness thus is caused by 
a failure of the eyes insofar as they no longer know what to do as eyes. In the case of such 
defects, she identifies old age as a decay in the self-knowledge of body parts: “sometimes the 
Sensitive Body decays, before the Rational Mind; and sometimes the Rational Mind, before the 
Sensitive Body” (1668, 86). These later developments in her view in the Ground allow her to 
accommodate more subtle failures of visual perception, such as in the two men thought 
experiment, with even greater explanatory resources than in her previous work, and they 
represent a third stage in her development of her account of visual perception beyond what was 
evident around the time she composed the Letters. The earlier discussion of the transition from 
the 1655 edition of Opinions to the 1663 edition showed Cavendish removing from her account 
the physiological characteristics of the eyes in her explanation of blindness and appealing to 
patterning self-motions. Her later development of these ideas in the Ground incorporates her 
view of matter as intelligent and draws upon the idea of self-knowledge, which can be possessed 
more or less by parts of the human body, as essential to explaining defects in visual perception. 
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